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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF \ITAH 
STATE OF l!TAH, in the interest of: 
BABY GIRL :-!ARIE, CASE NO. 252370 
A Person Unrler Ei~hteen Yearo of Age 
BRIEF UF ,\PPELIANT 
S I.\ TE:IEXT Uf ntE NATURE OF THE CASE 
filis is an appeal by Lhe natural mother from an Order and 
JucLT'·.'nt ,,;- t''" Juvenile Court entered on January 9, 1975, permanently 
lc:privinc· ':cr <)I all parental rL;ilts in connection ·cit'· her child, baby 
cirl :-•aric:; anJ irun a ,le>ciciic·n of th.c Juvenile Court on May 4, 1976, 
reiu.in.' t0 vacate and set aside as null and void its order entered on 
January (J, l'j75. 
l!lSPc>SITION IN LO.<ER COURT 
:he Juvc:nilc Court, upon petition of the Utah Division of 
l'.lc,ily Service'-, found that the natural mother was unable to provide 
:J<'cq•JatL'h· f,,r all tile need· of -;aiel child and agreed that it was in 
the hl·--;t 1ntcre:st ,-.f saiJ child for parental rights to be terminated 
~1n(• t~H- -.J.ill '--'lil! t·1 ~l(' placeJ f,lr aJl>ption. l'~n April 22, 1976, a 
a~ 'JL'l,\ at 1-:hic\1 tllL' Tuvenile cl~urt refused to vacate and set 
iU::LILt' Sc1UC11T UN APPEAL 
~ t_,1 have Lhc ,1rdc.r of the Juvenile Court, 
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terminating the appellant's parental rights, set aside as null and void 
because it was entered beyond the dispositional po1oer of the Juvenile 
Court under the particular circumstances of this case. Also, the appel-
lant seeks reversal of the decision of the Juvenile Court, entered on 
May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate and set aside the Court's order of 
January 9, 1975. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Nadine Munoz, on August 10, 1974, gave birth to a 
baby girl named Marie, 1ohen the appellant 10as sixteen (16) years of a!'"· 
The natural mother's parents refused to permit her to bring the child 
home, so a temporary custody authori:<.ation ,,,as given by the appellant 
to the State of Utah, Division of Family Services (hereafter DFS I on 
the day the child was born. Appellant at no time 1vanted to give the 
baby up for adoption, but ,,·as receiving extreme pressure from her par-
ents to du so and ad,;icc ' 
up her child tur acioptic,·-
the •:S Social I·Jorker that 'h" should ·ivc 
An initlal r,<cGCln~ -!as lteld on August 15, 1'!74, at ,_,hich tltc' 
baby girl was placed in the temporary custody of IJFS becauc>e the juvc:n-
ile-mother had not been permitted by her parents to bring the child i,,,me 
with her from the hospital. Another hearing was scheduled for ,\ugu' t 
22, 1974. 
At the August 22, hearing the juvenile mother l-Ias aclvi,.cd IJ\ 
the Juvenile Court referee of her right to counsel. She Jc,irl!d t<~ 
speak with counsel, so the matter 1-1as continued to lktuhcr l, 1'1/",. 
The child was continued in the temporary custody ,f Ill'S. l'ltc· "' (,,),,' 
arraignment ~Vas rescheduled for October 24, l'J7!+, at 1-ilti, l1 lin"· '" "''' 
-2-
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for the appellant appeared before the court and entered a denial to a 
petition 1-:hicil had bcc:n filed by DFS alleging that the appellant did 
not want to, nor had she the capability to care for her child. At the 
October 24, arraignment, custody of the child was continued with DFS; 
the natural mother 1o1as granted t·..:ice-;:eekly visitation rights with her 
child ;:hich she exercised: and trial was set for November 6, 1974. 
On ~~vember 6, the appellant appeared before the court, with 
counsel. The court \·:as advised that the appellant wanted to keep her 
child but that 'oer ~arents • ..:ould not allo" her to bring the child into 
their home. Thereafter, the rourt ordered that the child be placed 
temp.>raril\· · .. :ith :JFS, and •:et revie1: in one vear. This was done because 
the juvenile-~other was only sixteen (161 years ~: a:e anrl, at that 
tine, tmable to indcpcndentl,· support the child. No evidence was intro-
duced t•' tile court that this probler:1 l·:ould not rectify itself over tine. 
on flt.:.<cn~lcr 2, lq7~, ~rs filed yet another !1CV pct:.ti~..'n 
rcqucc;tin-· pL!l:"":"'anent tct:'"'inati\'n l'f the appcllant 1 s ?arer1tal rights • 
. -\ hcJrin ·.:a- "~.. 1 1L··Julccl :-\,r J.J.n'rary g' 1g75. ~;o notice of this new 
prtl\._L'L:llin: ·.:1·, :--.cnt l.:t1 ~..tllm~c·l f('r the juvenile-mother. Summons by 
puhliLati\1!1 :a~ entercJ ~-,,r ,,nL j..._-..)ln L)oc, the unkn,'\·.'11 father of baby 
1rl '1ariL. 
jilL j.J.nuar-~; \! 1'~-:5, i1c.:1ring •-:a:- helJ, at h'hich the juvenile-
't!Jcr .J.ppLJ.rL~ in rL, P'';l~L t,l .:1 --wmnons. She. \;as nDt represented by 
L ,)1111 L 1, Il•lr did her 11arLIIl' ..1ppcar h'ith her beiore the court, the par-
l 11L l,J\'111. pr-..__\.l•lll'-l': ~-etu t·,i l,l l1a\·c .1nythin:~ to Jo \Vith the matter. 
1
1
.L " 1ari lYn [lalc, tile \lfS Sc'Ci<'l l<orker 
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ever since the child was born. At this hearing the juvenile-mother 
agreed to the termination of her parental rights because her parents 
refused to permit her to bring the child into their home, which, ,,f 
course, was where the appellant also lived at the time and indeed still 
lives. 
For the next year the appellant made repeateu visits to the 
Ogden DFS office, seeking knowledge about her chilo. No one 1wulu tell 
her anything -- not even that the child '"as adopteu in August '~'f 1975. 
Finally, the social worker told the appellant she shoulu consult :~n 
attorney, which she did immediately in Harch of 1976. The result 1.Jac 
the petition to the court, heard on April 22, l97b, requestin,; that the 
court, pursuant to Section 55-10-106, u.c.A. 1953, as amended, set :hick 
and vacate its order entered on January 9, 1975, penr,anently t"rminatin 
the appellant's parent-child relationship. 
This appeal is taken from the decision of the court, t·ntc·r,,J 
after the April 22, 1::·76, 1 .ca.;cin_, dcnying the petition tcJ vacate an·l 
set aside the January 
ARGUHENT 
POINT l 
TERMINATION ACTIONS BEING EQUITY PROCEEIJlNCS tJI TilL IIIC:IILS I 
DEGREE, THE SUPREHE COURT HAY RE\'lr:l-1 l'IIJ: lcVIlli:JICI: ,\!rll 'L\I:L 
INDEPENDENT FINDINGS OF FACT. 
This appeal has been brought hc.ocause it i '· fc:lt L11al Ll" I:~ 
enile Court exceeded its authority by makii1h a dic_;])(J'-,i t~i(lll l 1 'nllirl.Ll1'1 
the parental rights of the juvenile-mother l·litiJ()ttl c:tric Lly , "" .1,~,,, 
and following the substantive and procC>dural rc''J"i n~'''"''"~ "I Li" 
-4-
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termination statute. Section 55-10-109, u.c.A. 1953, as amended. This 
appeal, being an equity proceeding of the highest degree, In re Adoption 
of lJ 122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223, at 226 (Utah 1953), the Court may 
review the evidence and make an independent determination of what the 
facts are. \,'alton v. Coffman, llO Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97, at 103 (Utah 
1946!, and In reState of Utah, in the interest of Ronald Jennings and 
Donald Jennings, 20 Ut.2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (Utah 1967). 
It is submitted that the Juvenile Court, which is given a 
Jisp<>sition:ll <''"··:cr t,, terminate parental rights under Section 55-10-lJO 
( lt1 1, .._an ,,nly L:·:~.;rL 1::.c that po•.,.,rer "provided that the provisions of Sec-
ti,>n )~-1(1-l'''' arc u>Dplic·d ·.:ith." S~ction 55-10-100(16). And, in 
c1 ccreJ in derogation 
ti,)nal p,;•,;cr ,,i the Juvenile Court. It is further subnitted that upon 
111ll L'X.:lr inatiun ,11 tlze t-act:-. and evidence of tl1i:-. .._a ..... c. that th~. 
t)l Lllc Ju\"cni l1_: l'·· 1rt, entered t)n Jan11ary ':J, 1~.}--::, . <- 1aade withuut JiJt.: 
r-v,_.ard :-,,r L'1c 1i -~l tan,:.JrJ ,,1 LJrL' and JiligL'nLt..: required in such 
ca.~c", n··r '>·.':1 1L c:adc ·"itll due rc . ;arJ f~.1r statutolJ' requirements; nor 
'.·:itl1 d.1c rc_·ar,l ltll- t!IL' r1:ht::. L,!- the )U\'cnile-mL'~ther in seeing the 
ltat:tJt-,tl :1,lrLJ1L-~._llll,! rL·latl,~Jt--lli:l ~._,•ntintlc--l. 
i\•1:.~; 1 I 
JilL Jc:,l,;;ll.l. l<•LWl iL\:> JilL llJ!ERE?.~l Pl~,'EIZ Ill, Af ANY IDlE, 
:lllli]l \ ,q~ '.\c.\LL .\ l'IZL\'lclUSLY l:?."l'l:IZE!l ERRclNEllUS LlRflER, PUR-
~1.<.· ,,, ·.,, 1, lc•:: ',-] •-1''", U.l· •. \. l<l5J, AS ."u'IENDED. 
]'' 
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1953, as amended, requesting the Juvenile Court to vacate tho tormina-
tion order due to substantive and procedural mistakes in tho January 'J, 
1975 hearing. Section 55-10-106 provides: 
The Court may modify or set aside any order or Jecrec 
made by it; but no modification of an nrucr placin~ a 
child on probation shall be made upon an alleged vio-
lation of the terms of probation, <mtil there has been 
a hearing after due notice to all persons concerned. 
Notice and a hearing shall also be re'luircrl in anv 
other case in which the effect of modifying or sc::tin~ 
aside an order may be to deprive a par<ent <1[ the lc,·al 
custody of the child, or to make other chant:e in lc·~al 
custody. 
In Utah it has been held that a Juvenile Court has the pc·n.•er to rc,,pcn 
a case and modify its order at any time after entrY. St.,ker v. Cm:an 
45 Ut. 556, 147 P. 911 (Utah 1915). This deci sian l·:as .crdunJcd upun 
Chapter 54, Laws of Utah 1913, which provided that· 
All orders, judgments, and decreces sc1 made anJ entered 
by the court shall be under its centro l, and mC!y he 
modified, amended, or recalled at any time 11ntil th" 
child reaches the age of twenty-one years. 
The substance of this l'r2·:> coG "· 
this state ever since 
55-10-31, u.c.A. 1953) and constltutes thee statllt•>r': l<Jl'<cr<mnc·r ell Lll, 
present Section 55-10-106. Also, morce rcc"ntly in tiJC ca'c· ,,J .lac,,!, 
Public Welfare Commission, 7 Ut.2d '304, 32J P • ..'<l 7..'11, aL 7'.!. (IlLah I'.:·,( 
the Court stated: 
That the Juvenile Cudct maJ· rnorlj Jy 1 t'-, ,,r,1, , .. 1·. t·· 
custody or other disposition <Jf c\li_ldl ~n pn1pcrl:,· 
under its jurisdictj_un hcc_att:-oc ()1 (L ... ~lilH]tlL'lH .. ~/, 
neglect, or dependency, l·lhere parcntc. p1·rmanenll:· 
have been dispossessed of tltL.:ir rji·.liL' 111 .t~tll 
children seems unJebatabl~. 
It is submitted that not only doc:~ the: .Juvcni l,· t.clllft 113'.'< 
the inherent power under its governing statutv L{l (.:llrrcct pn·vintt· L· 
-6-
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committed errors but that the Juvenile Court may do so under Section 
55-l,J-l(J(J 3t ~ time, even though the normal time in which an appeal 
\·:ould othencioc bt allowed has lapsed. 
PIJU,i III 
Till: AP!T LL'L~f '.,·As :;, r: GUILTY 11F !.ACHES IN PETITIONING THE 
JL\t:::ILE rnr_'RT Tn \'ACATE ITS PRIOR TERl'liNATinN ORDER; THE 
?i:liTI,,:; C:'' Till. JU\t:NILE COURI AND HER APPEAL fRO!-! BaTH THE 
''klCI::C\L : I:K:Il::,\TIU:: URDER .-\.\'ll THE JUVENILE COURT'S REFUSAL 
' T:.\C. ,JRIJER, .\RE TI:!ELY. 
S,;cti.J11 :<i-1 J-'i(J, G.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides that in 
cirLun~t.:lncc;-, in '.·:hi~.._h a party ,,·as nuL represented by counsel, the 
L,,urt '':ollall inl-L'!-r tllLr-'. at tl1e Lonclusion ,~.[ ~r~cecdings that they 
l1a\·e: tl1~.: ri~t1t t~._) ...1ppcdl.', (Sec also Rule 26, UJCRPP 1974). The Juv-
':a·: -~ , l ~~ 7 • 
~ 1 ','( fl ll l 11 i ·\crlil, -r·:,,tht:r, appellant ll..._~rcln. ~:~'\·:ever, the 
-~·: th.lt the _iu\·cnill2-rc•ther ~-·as suilty of lacheo in 
...111' her child by \,·aitin~ over a year to do 
,, , 1.\ir 1 n 
,! i)jl} i l ..._l'l lt l_, 1 l 1 [\,_ \_ l r \_I 
I l r \ , 1 L i ~.._ ; ~ I I 
IL ..._ 11 L L lll·<l l hat laL-!lc~ l·annl)t 1.1e imputcJ to one who 
; de l 
ilL 1 ll II I cl, \ • I I• lL' 1 , ) \,l\. 111-, Lit. )/,., 14"' P.2d 328, at SJl (Utah 
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Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, (Utah 1975), at 1260 citing Archam-
bault v. Sprouse, 215 S.C. 336, 55 S.E.2d 70, 12 A.L.R.2d 399 (1949l. 
Indeed it has been held that an unreasonable length of time in asserting 
one's legal rights or duties to which laches might otherwise apply, does 
not start to run until knowledge of one's legal rights or duties is 
shown to exist. Stephan et al v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association, 
522 P.2d 478, at 490 (Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1974). In this particular situa-
tion, this was not the case. The court specifically stated that the 
appellant was not made aware of her right to appeal, and one can hanllv 
expect an inexperienced sixteen (16) year old juvenile-mother, in th<e 
aftermath of such a traumatic experience to be aware of or even suspect 
the various technical points of the laH. 
Boruff v. United States, 310 F .2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962), a c rir".-
inal case, provides an analogous situation. In that case the United 
States Court of Appeals ~or the 5th Circuit held that the time perioJ 
in which an appeal o: a c ·~·.·ict:ic~ must be taken did not be;::in to r'm 
until the defendant ·.·o. 
··• .. ~ his right to appeal, <..•here thl.' 
defendant had not been informed by the trial court that he had this 
right. The case here at issue involved a young, unsophisticated ·cirl, 
acting under great stress, not represented hy counsel nor infor.,cd h·: 
the court of her right to appeal at the conclusion of the: ilc<lrinc. ,11, 
facts of this case certainly justify a re-application ,[ that r"li11 
This is especially true '"hen Section 55-10-'JG, u.c.A. l'J~ l, ,l, .lm.:,·lcccl, 
and Rule 26 of the Juvenile Cou•:t Rules of Practice and Pruced,rc· ,h'\ l 
ically direct the judge at the end of the l1earin·.· tc• 1nlun" ,, pan:. 
unrepresented by counsel, of the right to appeal. ]L ic, Llhr·,iLL,,I c~L 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the petition to the Juvenile Court, requesting the setting aside of the 
temination order, ._.,a, proper and timely whether thought of as either 
in the nature of a prelude to an appeal or as a request to the Juvenile 
Court for vacation of its January 9, 1975, order under its inherent 
po,,·er ~ranted by Section :i:i-10-106, for the very reason that the Juven-
ile Court failed to 1ulfill its statutory duty under Section 55-10-96. 
P1llXT I\' 
L ... :_·lsrs .,r I!![ ;nur::An,,:: SL\IL'IE, SECTIOK 55-10-109 u.c.A. 
Sccti,>rc 55-l''-l''"'l· • L·.c.A. 1953, as amended, does not grant 
to tl1c ]'1\"cnilc Court a ·...:::ene:ral authorization to terminate a parent's 
parc:ttal :-Llot:, ~-L-.'lt_, it!: £~· child · .. :lte.ne\·l:r t·:c .._~'urt suspects that a 
Lhi 1,~ r-,i·.....:!lL ')L .::ul,,r._.:..__L: .:. ;)L ttLr lilt r,.:ith a ner,~· set of parents. Rather, 
L;l..._ t""'-)'-·:cr _rantL t .... , c:1L L0trrt l::> a :::,ptcial, limited, dispositional 
-1 -~ 
Ct d 1. l-.'' 
]_ .. 
.':' 
1~r 1r0~ eviG~nce prcs211teJ to the court 
.[c>lL .;: vt,,]l In the Interest ,,f Pitts' 535 P.2d 
1-tll- thL r, ScL L i .... 1n JS-10-109 con cains rather 
._,,dr.l~ ·hich r.1ust be met to assure that the 
Jld!.l r1L ~ :ll': .J.n,l t~.,:, lj'JJLLl: ',,3~ Jn urhlcr.stdnJing ,lf the termination 
i l I ' '~ l l' 1 I I I [he advice of rtsht to 
'l l ci ,II! l '. ;1i ,l, \ 'i'•'" Cilte ""nl hy Sectic1n 55-lll-109(2). It is 
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asserted that when the record of a termination proceeding wholly fails 
to reveal such advice having been given, that this constitutes reversible 
error in and of itself. Unless each and every applicable provision of 
Section 55-10-109 is fully and completely satisfied, a disposition of 
termination cannot be permitted to stand. "Children are not realty and 
rights pertaining to them must be handled with care and proper procedure." 
State of Utah in the interest of Pitts, supra, at 1248. 
Section 55-10-109 specifies only four circumstances under 
which a Juvenile Court may properly terminate the parental relationship 
and thereby overcome the very strong presumption in the law that a child 
is better off with its natural mother, D ___ P ___ v. ~~· i ·1 •;cr'.'ices, 
19 Ut.2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (Utah 1967). Under Section 55-li,->, 
the court may decree termination 1-1hen it finds "That the parent "r par-
ents are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition serious-
ly detrimental to the child." This paragraph of the statute contemplate' 
situations where a parent, tr r''J;;h n1s or her o\m conduct cau'.c" L•)ndi-
tions seriously detr ir.·c 
.1lJ. Examples of the applicati ,,, 
of this paragraph have included where the mother I·Jas mentally unstable 
and essentially neglected her children altogether, In re State of utah, 
In the Interest of Ronald Jennings and Donald Jenninc;s, 211 L.:L.2d '!", 
432 P.2d 879 (Utah 1967); where a fathe1· killed his I·Jife in 1 r""' '•i' 
children, In re State of Utah In the Interest "i f:,•bin [J :l•tlli n at•·> 
Kelley Lee Hullin, 29 Ut.2d 376, 510 P.2J 531 (Utah l'JiJI; "!''-''' cl11· 
mother of the children lacked che n~eressary ,::illo to sup<:rvi •.,,. ,lll•l 
train her children, coupled with pour housckccpin· 
low moral standards of the mother, State of Utah in the: i 11 Lc rc' L 
-10-
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532 P.2d 997 (Utah 1975); and in other instances where the acts of the 
parents themselves are seriously detrimental to the welfare of the child, 
In re State of Utah, in the interest of Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance, 
23 Ut.2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (Utah 1970). The import of this paragraph of 
the statute is aimed at situations or conditions which are directly 
attributable to the actions or lack of actions on the part of the par-
ents themselves. This paragraph of the statute is not directed at the 
situation of a sixteen (16) year old juvenile-mother, whose parents 
refuse to allmc her to bring her child home. It is not aimed at situa-
tions l>here, as the December 2, 197.13, petition for termination to the 
Juvenile Court alleged, the juvenile mother "through no fault" of her 
own was unable to temporarily care for her child. It is not meant to 
encor1pass situations ,,·here ::m otherwise fit and proper juvenile-mother 
;.•as not permitted to bring her child home and no clear and convincing 
~\·iJcnLe '-·.'as pr,___·sent€'d t~) the c,)urt that, given a little time, the f-h,r;~e 
::-itll~lti.)n ,•f Lllc t:JL'titi ,n._r ·:~,uld 11<..Jl have correcteJ itself, which was 
indcccJ ·"·hat har~,n~·l in this particuLn case. This court has held: 
D~..-'pri·:~ltiL'n ot th12 parents' custody of their children 
ts a Jrastic rccmedv which should be resorted to only 
1r1 L -,_rr'-·~·,c ~._·J>..._·:-. a.nJ h''hc.n it is manifest that the 
lJ•'r·~ it~·o.:·l· cannl._1t l'r \,•ill not correct the evils 
h'lll_~._:l l'> .. l ~L • • Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance, 
Stipr3, at J97. 
Scctic•n )~-l<l-lU''\li (b) and (c) contemplate two of the remain-
ing three L i rcur.ts ranees h'hereby a Juvenile Court may terminate a parent-
lllcy encompass circumstances \\'here a parent has 
L'l Li 1c:r JbJJJc:•'l1u' ,J ,,,d,! "r r"fus.:d to car" for the child after a trial 
- ll-
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and will not be discussed further. 
The fourth, and last, c:il'Ctt'''~ I1L·ro2in a JLIVcnilc Cnurt 
may assume the dispositional pm .. ccr t(1 t'--·n~'} ,;dt 3 ,,n-cnt-child rclatidn-
,t·: :•c >·L-,1-nlj llZltL·d IIJ1tl!l The parent-child rL·l~ti.,n~l-; 
voluntary petition u_;_ '''1'-- ,1r 
finds that such termin::ll:i•'~n i..::. 
'L'' 11_1}- I'!~ i1 tile Ltllll"t 
:)L·~l interest of 
l> ~-·- 1 ll ,, L 1, ·n \·.'i tl1 
in l:hc' 
the parent anL: the.. , 11; L,. ~)''-II 
respect to one p~re:nt doc~ ll•ll ·Lfc(_·t tl1c ri_:hts ,,f 
the other parent. 
This portion of the <to~ j..:: lc r_-j 
or parents come volunt~~- 1=, 1 ll' 'I'" "I 
don't "tvant it (or can't c.;Xt...' _~_,1,- iL1 p.1rl'nl,1l 
rights and find a hnr.~ l •- ,::i1c '- iri 1 ,-, L 1 t"' ,_, t t II,-·~ "IlL 11 --1!! 
occurrence is prcse1·· ~ I.:. II•_: 
' 
(II t 
' " 
ti' l ,l t ]I-, '1,). l the: . ., ., ,-_ I ~· • 
ent perform an affic~at: ,)(._ 
'-
1 '--, t ,. c~ L t l '\ ,q- Ill.. I, ,1 
court disposition, I i •IIJ-l ' ( 1.-:cr,..~i n.1 :_ 
' 
<111. 
This is a two-s:c I 
' 
L l l 
and voluntar~l) r~ 
" 
I 1- l'-l 
must make a determinati··~, 
' '" 
it, that such a dispo~itic'Il \ll l I ll ,,, l i· 
and the child. 
Also, Sccti tl I t d I 
disposition on the rart ' 1:11._ J 11 /l n L·- ',, 
untarily appear bciore th 'Jill 1 ,,,(1 r• •11. 
specifically dcnie;, t(J 1-h, 1'/• , 1 1 I C, ~-, • 1.1 t r • 
parental rights of a par· ,,- 1, .. I 1•'1 ; l J 
personally before til'" , Lcnrl-
'I' I L'l, 
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it is clear that the parental rights of a father, whose name the peti-
tioner chose not to reveal, could not be terminated upon publication of 
a notice of hearing in a newspaper. The Juvenile Court cannot hang a 
termination on both pegs; either the court terminates the relationship 
for cause, or does so upon a voluntary petition. It should not be per-
mitted to terminate the rights of a parent who appears personally and 
voluntarily before the court on a voluntary petition, and at the same 
hearing atterq1t to terminate, for cause, the parent-child relationship 
of the non-appcdrlnc; parent in the same proceeding. The processes are 
separate and di,tinct, requiring different evidence on both points. To 
allm,· otherHise 1wuld permit an unintended circumvention of the statute 
tO OCLUre 
Plllt\1 \' 
filL: .\PPELL\::i · .. :.\S ::tlT IC.TOI\:lEfl tll' At\"D 1·.'.-\S THEREBY DENIED HER 
FIL:JIT Ill (t>·~:s.:L. 
\ ih;,Jrirr,- L•' c~._·rr indtc p..1rental ri:;hts in a child is d most 
sericl,J:-. !'<J.ttcr an,· ::-IJ,lul~l ~'nl~: l'c LJnJcrt..lkcn in extreme cases. That 
thi.'-> type L'l lll,tfin.· 1:- qtiltL' ::--L·~·i~.._,Lt::- l:hcn ...1n adult parent's rights are 
ri·.~ht'- \)~ ~1 jll\'LJlllL•-'1\'l[i]..._l- cl~-L' ::_-,(1[J~i1t t('> be_ ternlillatcd by the COUrt, 
t!J(' d11ty •ll ~__,1!-L l!l•' lih' >f\._Ll'"-':-it} t\ 1 J<.JllCihl r1·0pcr procedure rises tQ 
..1 "l ,t}L' IJ!lpl·~ L"l\!t'lilL'I~ t"\'L'[l lll ~l•]Lrll ~.,_,J;-;L_'S• rhat this is especially true 
1..'/tt._•ll r~(L'Ilt,d ri·'ilt> >j 3 I\I\'CllilC-!1h1thcr .:lrC ::-LlUf';ht tO be terminated, 
111 till' ,lh'-,L'I1ll \•1 '-'l'lll'''-1 ! \1r Lh(_' \tl\'Cnilc.-m..._lthcr, simply cannot be 
,fl'll i l l 1 • 
,"'~L''-'ti,\n SS-ltl-qb makes it abundantly clear that 
- I \-
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the legislature acknowledged, and expressed o. concern l~c•r, the rightc; c>t 
juveniles to adequate representation by counsel in o.ll ',:eneral juvenile 
court proceedings. However, Section 55-lll-1119(21 transfers the general 
to the specific. In each and every tennination nroccedin·~ the C<'tirt has 
the mandatory duty to inform the parties ,,[ thc'ir ri ,~ht to counsel. (Sec 
also Rule 33, UJCRPP 1974). In this rarticular case, the record of the 
January 9, 1975 termination hearim; 1.>hollv fails to disclose anv such 
advice being given by the court. The rec0rcl discloses that the Jtivcnilc 
Court merely began the hearing hy readin~ the petition that had been 
filed with the court (Tr. 1, Jan•Jar" g, 1975). Theo r~c,,rrl discloses 
that only the juvenile-mother, a 'is >!arilyn llalc of LJFS, and ~Is ~!arc o.rc·t 
Peterson of the court prol.Jation olficc. .:1ppearcd ~)1.._·fl1r(· ti~c cn11rt on Jan-
uary 9, 1975. (Findings ,:: 'act anJ Deocrcc, Jan11ar; ~. 1'17') 1. Thee 
record discloses that Hhcn '!..._ '-Iril'"·- li.J.lL' (l[ ~lf'S r.~a(1c r','lLrL·nl-c t..._, 
representation by counsel ac 
question the juvenilc--
9, 1975 hearing (Tr. 2, JJ.t, 
show that notice of the Janc1ary Y, l 'Jr, hcar in 
other than the juvenile-mother. 
i \',:n t,, an':(lJ1L 
In the memorandum decisi 1ln L L:l1c.: CCHlrt, l'o'":lr..:'~ aJ tcr tltc 
April 22, 1976 hearing, the cottrt in(~iLau_, 1 ;J.·1rn r,lph J, '1LIIlnrandun' 
Decision, Hay 4, 1976) that thr· (_our-t'' r(· (1lll,_L),)q '.J rl·I_l_l her! t:\1<Jt 
the mother had been advised of her r1;~1lt tu 1 nt~n·.t·l pri~n- tc1 ,Htival il1n 
of the recorder. It ic, submittcod ti,'"t titer< i, 
grounds. First, the rc:cord uhir h 
logical reading of thee tran:,cri rt iJl lit(' ldi"t:tr" ')j) li(•,"\1-Jil,' 
- ]_.~-
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convey the impr.ession that ouch adviLe was given or that the recorder 
was inadvertently turne:•' on late:, J.fter the hearing had cormnenced. 
Secondly, ~>!hen discussion took place upon this issue at the April 22, 
1976 hearing, the Court requested evidence from Mr. Jones of the prose-
cuting attorney's office (Tr. 11, April 22, 1976) as to whether or not 
he recalled a .liscu•sion prior to turning on the recorder. During this 
time the Jt!Venilc-.-hlthcr '.-:as sh,1kin·r.!, her head in disagreement to the 
content of the court'• discussion (Tr. 12, April 22, 1976) yet the court 
refused t•• all.•• .. : tc,ticwn-; ~r.Jm the juvenile-rcother herself as to whether 
nr not she ,,·as advi•e.! ,•f her right to cc•unsel (Tr. 14, April 22, 1976). 
It is J.ssertl',; that t'•i• ·:as an abuse ,,f the discretionary power of the 
L11urt. SinLL evidence ·.a--. hcarJ lrt:'I!T. the County .\tt ·:11ev, the juvenile-
nothcr :.lh)ulJ pr1_1pcrly lla·:~_ hcen all'-·)\~·eJ to testily u1 rebuttal, as this 
'.-:cnt tc1 3 ........ aterL1l allc..:ati,__-ln ,,: crr,)r on the part of the court at the 
:·\1._,,\~ in it" ncr'~..lran._~'l:-" ~c~_ision, the L<.JUrt inJi ... :ated ~Para-
..!raph "•, >~c:l•'ran-_!·c·" ·~c.._ i::-i.-,n, ''ay --.., l97L' 1 that even 1i there indeed \~'as 
>! l1c r r 1 I1L 'ill"'. 
IC 01- in __ . 11. 
" 
.. c \'•- 1·, 
I 11 1"• '),__·• 
.ll 1[1'1, Ill' ,j]'["J, I t•' 
l' t'll' 1 t 
c I ,!:],_ 
[ 'I l 
il" 1::. ' 
! 
111 .lpjlc~rcJ wit\1 coun~el at the prior 
!"o.-'l'llr·!1o2rL·J thJt the January 9, 1975 hear-
~ I '~ 
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a juvenile need only be apprised of his right to counsel the first time 
the child ever appears in the juvenile court, and not thereafter. Ad-
vice of right to counsel iG not a blanket statement given once and then 
waived for each new matter. Each and every time a child appears before 
the court on a new petition, the advice of right to counsel must be 
given anew. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY TERHINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Section 55-10-109(5) sets out the requirements for a voluntary 
termination of the parent-child relationship. However, this appellant 
did not appear voluntarily before the Juvenile Court. Rather, she 1vas 
summoned on a petition filed with the court by DFS. In its memorandum 
decision (Paragraph 7, Hemorandum Decision, ~lay 4, 1976) the court 
stated that this error 'vas ct:solved ~Jhen the juvenile-mother agreed to 
the termination in cc1rt Ja:"~~HY 9, 1975 thereby ratifying the peti-
tion filed by DFS. 
-., - 1 ~ ,1a~ t\JO errors. First, no matter ho\..' 
the court tries to bend the facts to fit the statute, the mother 11as, in 
fact, not voluntarily before the court. The court has chosen to regard 
the termination as a voluntary relinquishment (Paragraphs 5, 7, >lemor-
andum Decision, Hay 4, 1976). That being the case it \·JOulrJ have been 
necessary for the natural mothec to vul•mtarily submit the petition L" 
the court rather than DFS. The mere fact that she appeared on January 
9, 1975 indicates nothing more than that th<e juvenile-mother 1vas aw;v!l r-
ing the SUliU!lons. That contains not evcen a hint of voluntariness. It 
is submitted that the lack of a voluntary petition, standing alone, 1' 
sufficient statutory error to require revcersal of the court order l.'hl'n 
-lb-
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~I.e tcmination is characterized as a voluntary relinquishment. Further, 
that the sununons to the temination lt"aring made it not a voluntary re-
linquishment but rather an adversary proceeding in which the child could 
only have been removed from the mother for cause. (Tr. 10,20, April 22, 
1976). The Juvenile Court made much of the fact that the juvenile-
mother "offerrcJ no defense or resistance hereto, legally or actually." 
(Para,:raplt I, :·enora:oJum Decision, 'lay 4, 1976). However, a careful 
rcaJin,- of ti1c tran,,ript of the January 9, 1975 hearing indicates that 
the: r:lL>thcr ..._uulC 1.arl:ly L\·en talL, let alone prepare or present a defense, 
nor <1oulc~ , :1e: :1a\·c hccn rcas.)nably expected to have done so. Indeed 
pro"--c._c.,:in L:1araLtLr1zeJ a a \'''lunlaty relinquishment. It is submitted 
that iL ~1J·11tl~._i bL ],L l..._~, ..1~ J :-~at teL- u[ la\-.', that a juvenile-mother, here 
- i:<lt....:Lll ( lr ·;LJ.r > 
'Lilt 1 i 'lL:· :.,11,' :lly '11cn cltL re:L~._,rd ,..,f the c.J.se conclusively 
Li•Lll Ll1L j,,_·~._r•i l~~-:· l''L .. :Lll):__'-- t~.• :~Lc 1 ~ l1cr ..._hilJ. (Tr. 2, 3, 
J..lilll..lJ-:_ 
·L ~l ~._h,'::-L·n t,_, L-haLJ.ctcrize the pro-
\' •] 'I• L l i i] !' LiiL ~rr. ',', .\pril 22, 1976, and Para-
r ,J i'll 
' 
1 " ··-..1·· ., l'-~7t· 1 1·.::1thcr than a termination 
, r dll c , l ftL 11 
., 
·h L <'I Li, 1 ,L[ 
1\,__;,ilL-rl<'L'llr LhL)~L' not tu reveal. Characterized 
11 :_ .tl r 1 :1 l 
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POINT VII 
THE EVIDENCE WAS \ffiOLLY INS UFFICIEI'rT TO PERHIT A TERI'liNATION 
FOR CAUSE. 
While characterizing the termination as " volunt<lry relinquish-
ment, the Juvenile Court has tried to allaH itself an out by also imply-
ing that sufficient cause existed for termination irregardless of the 
alleged voluntary nature of the termination (Paragr<lph 10, ~!emorandum 
Decision, May 4, 1976). The finding that the juvenile-mother Has unable 
to adequately provide for her child '"as based solely upon the statement 
of the appellant that she could not keep her child because her parents 
refused to alloH her to bring the child home. Termination '..Jas ordered, 
in spite of the fact that the court had previously entered the ~ovember 
6, 1974 order placing the child with DFS for one year, 1iliich wCls in it-
self an adequate tempcrar:,· solution to the problem, This juvenile-
mother Has una:Ole :r c,cc-o- -=.r:'-1-: care for her chilLI only in that she ' .. 'Cls 
impecunious in her oHn rl,~itt, 1;as dependent upon her parents for support, 
and her parents had refuseJ to provide any financial support for the 
child, The December 2, l97l! pcti tiun, filed l!itl> the court by DFS, 
represented the exact situation contemplated hy Chief Justice !!enri<>d 
in his dissent in State of Utah in the: interc:st of T,G,, Sl2 P.2d '!''7, 
at 999 (Utah 1975), where an impecunious mother, uho uCls in Litis case· 
impecunious "through no fault of her own" (December 2, l'J75, petition 
to Juvenile Court) 1-1as denied the ri;~ht nf companionship ,,j tit Iter cit i I 
after the Juvenile Court had alreaJy ceLttercd an ord'-'r placinc; the clti !d 
in the temporary custody of llFS for one year drtrin" l!ltich tl1c ],,,m,c -tL"-
ation of the appellant \-JOuld have had a chance to corrc•ct it·-cll. ,,\) 
-18-
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other reasons or evidence for termination were presented to the court, 
nor was testimony heard from any other party that the mother was in any 
way unfit or incompetent in a manner contemplated by statute, which was 
of her own doing. It is submitted that the evidence presented was 
wholly insufficient, as a matter of law, to deny custody of the child 
to its natural ~other for cause. It is also submitted that both the 
evidence relating to voluntary relinquishment, and the evidence relating 
to the alleged tcrnination for cause, both fail to meet even the stan-
dard set out "Y LiHc cu<Jrt in regard to voluntary termination in State 
of Utah in the interc:st of Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244, at 1248 (Utah 1975) 
wherein the court said: 
i·.'e bcli(:VL' :,uch language comes '-l~._l.:J€ to .._our thinking 
t<' the "fic:ct that a child should not be taken from 
its parents save by clear and convincing evidence of 
intention to give up parental rights -- something 
al"'ost akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There \·:as no sho.,.:in.:_ ·.:llat~\·L.'r that the c~.,urt haC n..:1 alternative ~=·tner 
than to rcr~ove the ell iLl Cr·•r: its r.1other. :\or \-:as there any shov.ring 
that the soll: inc•-lr:lpctcncy ~'t the juvcnile-muther \\'as other than one 
imp0secl upc•n her bv \·irtuc o: her temporary status in life at the time 
,,f the court '1carinc. .\ termination bY the Juvenile Court based solely 
upon a ju\·cnilc 1 ....; tc!:por.J.~: statu:-- ~'r ~ration in life is not only an in-
justice to b···th ~arcnt and child buL i,; simplY offensive, not only to 
Hherein it says· 
lt i"- l-l1c purpll~c ·•i this act to secure for each 
'-hil~. l,_l)r.nn; hciore the juvenile CL'~urt such care, 
L·.ui.JanlL', and l'l)ntL·c"l, preferably in his o\m home, 
a::- \.'lll ~cr\'L ;li::. \·:t.:lfare anJ the best interests 
•1 t 1 <c Lcil<': t,• preserve anJ strengthen family 
- 1 q-
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ties whenever possible; to secure for any child 
who is removed from his home the care, guidance, and 
discipline required to assist him to develop into a 
responsible citizen, to improve the conditions and 
home environment responsible for his delinquency; 
and, at the same time, to protect the community and 
its individual citizens against juvenile violence 
and juvenile laH breaking. To this end this act 
shall be liberally construed. Section 55-10-63 
POINT VIII 
THE APPELlANT ONLY AGREED TO TER1'1INATION OF HER PARENTAL 
RIGHTS BECAUSE OF COERCION. 
The adamant refusal on the part of the juvenile-mother's par-
ents at the time the appellant agreed to the termination of her parental 
rights on January 9, 1975 constituted a subtle, yet very strong clement 
of coercion on the juvenile-mother's conduct. The appellant made a 
mistake by becoming prec;nant, and such an occurrence of um;cd motherhood 
had never occurred i~- "cr 'anc-'-ly before. As a result, the parents acted 
emotionally and , 1t in placing the sole decision-makin:· 
burden on a young girl 1-1ho in the midst of a hi~hly traumatic experience 
could be subject to over-persuasion on the part of DI"S social 1-JOrkers 
and indeed the court itself. At the hearing the court failed to thor-
oughly examine the background and competing pressures and influences on 
the j•Jvenile-mother. Rather, the Juvenile Court merely tooL the otanccc 
that an unrepresented, unadvised sixteen (16) Y'-'ar •Jld ~irl could make 
any and all decisions in an immediate, y~t rational fasldo:1. It is u 1J-
mitted that this is simply too great a burden tn expect" JIIVenilcc-
mother, vulnerable to undue influence, to "'ake on her m-m. AL t·f1,_· -,-r-: 
least, the court should have postponed the hcarin·.· until tl1c '-''"'n cirl 
would have been able to appear in court '.d tl1 a 1110rr· r:r;IJt ral a1l'.ri tl1 :trl 
-2(J-
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a DFS worker who had consistently recormnended termination. A simple 
analysis of the record indicates that the juvenile-mother was agreeable 
only because she felt she had no choice (Tr. 3, January 9, 1975). This 
is not a voluntary relin<]uishment, but per se coercion. 
CONCLUSION 
\~1en one looks at the overall picture and views the extent and 
magnitude of the deviance from statutory requirements, the denial of due 
process to the petiti<Jner is overwhelming. A child was taken from its 
natural CJother because she ;:as temporarily unable to care for her child 
because ,,f her temporary status of being a ju\·eni l.e. The Juvenile Court 
acted in has tc and l·:i thout due regard, indeed no regard for statutory 
requirements; and, ao ,uch, its actions must not be permitted to stand. 
The statute has a purpose, it has goals and requirements, and these 
standards CJust he met. The Juvenile Court shoulJ r.ot be allowed to 
cir~..umvcnt these .... tanJarJs thro....lu::;h inattention to statutory requirements 
or oimplv thrc1u:~h lack ,,f ,liligence. A termination proceeding is far 
too "criuus to bL handled \·:ith haste. 
1lnc lCJs t pcJint >.· hicl1 has been raised is the fact that the 
child has alr"ad\· been adc•rtuJ. This is truly unfortunate, extreme 
~rief ',:ill undouhtc,Jly ,),_;(._ur no nattcr hoh' the question is finally re-
'olved. lloh·evcr, J<Istice has not been done to the juvenile-mother, the 
pctitiuner herein. She ,.:as the victin or a casual and unlawful taking 
of her child, , l<>thccl in a mere semblance of legal requirements. She 
c:a·. nut alfonlcd tl1c henefi ts and protections accruing to her as a mat-
Lcr l)f L~i~·ht und(.._.r Llll Lermination statute. And, in certain 
-.'1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circumstances, even the old adage, that the \velfare of the child is all 
controlling, must yield to the requirements of due process under the la~; 
and equal justice in the courts as afforded hy statute. 
Appellant respectfully asks the Court to rule that the Juven-
ile Court lacked the dispositional p01ver under the particular circum-
stances of this case to terminate the parental rights of the Appellant; 
that the evidence failed to support a termination for cause; that the 
relinquishment Has not voluntary, therefore, that the order of the 
Juvenile Court should be vacated and set aside. 
-22-
Respectfully submitted, 
JA.'!ES R. HASENYAGER 
~ttorney for Appellant 
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